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iSSTPAC? 
This is a report of an empirical study of eighty-seven small-
scale rural firms, clients of Kenya's four Rural Industrial Development 
Centers. Its purpose is to measure profitability and social performance 
of firms Representing the Intermediate Sector of Kenya's economy. In addi-
tion, the study contains some descriptive statistics. 
Available data suggest that the Intermediate Sector is growing 
at sn accelerating rate and may be expected to continue to do so. The 
firms are typically small but provide a better than average Kenyan income 
for their owners. The rate of return on invested capital exceeds that of 
the Modern Sector by a substantial margin. 
Both the capital-output and the capital-labor ratios are low. 
Capital invested in the Intermediate Sector makes a larger contribution 
to national product and creates more employment than does an equivalent 
amount of capital formation in the Modern Sector. Furthermore the wages 
earned by workers compare tolerably well with working-class incomes of 
the Modern Sector and exceed wages in commercial agriculture. 
At various points within the paper, characteristics and 
problems of small-scale rural firms are discribed and some policy guidance 
is offered. 
A pu"hlic -pali.cy- o^ -sTtppar+r-arid promotion of the intermediate 
sectar-ia-justifiable only if we can verify empirically the casual obser-
vation that the very small-scale firms which comprise this sector yield 
a favourable--return on,..invested capital and generate employment at a low 
cost per job. Expenditure of public funds from a limited development 
budget requires identification of investment outlets in which both the 
capital/output and capital/labor ratios are low. 
In addition, a field study would yield descriptive data and 
provide insights into the problems of these firms which, in turn, might 
suggest specific policy guidence. It would be valuable, for example, 
to find support for or refutation of the commonly held notion that credit 
is a crucial bottleneck in the development of small-scale enterprise, 
that transport, utilities, or communication facilities would accelerate 
growth of rural industry, or that lack of product and technical production 
information is an obstacle to growth. Finally, an empirical study could 
reveal something about the behavior and characteristics of entrepreneurs 
of small-scale enterprise: managerial skills, accounting methods and their 
use, inventory or investment policies, the development and use of labor-
skills, and the background and training of the businessmen themselves. 
To these ends we at the Institute for Development Studies, 
University of Nairobi, undertook a field study of very small-scale rural 
enterprise. Our study revealed that the capital requirement per job 
created by these firms is low, much lower than for the economy as a whole; 
the return on capital invested is more favorable than the return ordinarily 
available in the Modern Sector. In addition the study suggested that 
infrastructure investment by the government would likely speed the growth 
of small-scale rural enterprise, credit is not a major bottleneck, and * : 
that management skills urgently need improvement. Alas, the study did 
not provide much help or guidence toward identification of enterpreneurial 
talent, a resource which by common consensus is in scarce supply in Kenya. 
I 
Our sample, all rural firms, was drawn from among the clients 
of Kenya's four Rural Industrial Development Centers (RIDC's. We chose 
* The RIDC's, presently four in existence out of a projected nine, are 
subsidiaries of the Kenya Industrial Estates, an organization which is, 
in turn, a. subsidiary of the Industrial and Commercial Development 
Corporation. The latter is a parastatal body with, as the name implies, 
responsibility for promotion, and financing in part, development projects 
in Kenya. Each RIDC has a manager and support staff, a general mechanic, 
a sheetmetal technician, a wood working technician and an expatriate adviser. 
The RIDC's have the special responsibility to provide small-scale rural 
industry with technical assistance and, if appropriate and available, credit. 
Each has a headquarters which contains workshops in which demonstrations, 
equipment repair, or even production operations can be provided for clients, 
and thejpe are classrooms for formal training programs. 
to study RIDC clients for two reasons: (l) client firms are selected for 
their high potential and (2) firms benefiting from RIDC assistance should 
be more cooperative about supplying information essential to our study. 
The estimate' of the potential of client firms is, of course, a matter 
of judgement on the part of RIDC personnel. Their criteria included 
the usual outward signs of success: profitability, growth, quality of 
product, appearance cf the firm's equipment and facilities, use of 
"modern" or "progressive" methods. In some cases the attitude, behaviour 
and personality of the owner of a struggling enterprise could be i jf 
persuasive. ' RIDC personnel seek.out- those enterprises which, in their 
judgement.,, a»e' likely to benefit from the services which the Center can 
provide. With due allowance for errors.in judgement, and the RIDC f managers wo^ld be the last to claim infallibility, one would expect RIDC 
it 
-cli-ents to/be above average performers in their business; if any small firms 
• / \ 
in rural Kenya can succeed, these should. In short, our sample was 
purposive;, not random; it is representative of the comparatively well 
managfed,.;'more or less successful rural enterprises. Hopefully, they are 
example^ of what small-scale rural enterprises can do and, perhaps, the 
protptypes for further industrialization. 
/ ' i < . . . . / ' ! i In the end, we discovered that not all af the firms visited 
had,' "nigh potential", some were poorly managed, some were losing money • : » •! 1 
an/1 sqem destined to failure, some survive only by constant transfusions 
of new capital. This should not be surprising* in economically advanced 
! 
highlydeveloped economies some of all newly established enterprises 
fail within two years. A newly developing economy should not be expected to 
do better. 
With respect to our access to;reliable 'irfcrmation, the apparent 3 t 
obligation of the client to the RIDC was expected.to create an openness 
i : i 
and qooperativeness which a randomly selected firm is unlikely to exhibit. 
Interviewers, with the cooperation of the RIDC managers, operated 
out of RIDC headquarters in their respective areas and were treated as 
i , 
de facto employees of the Centers. In each case the interviewer was a 
native of the region where he worked and spoke theilocal language. They 
. * 1 were also third-year, Bachelor of Commerce students at the University of 
Nairobi — a mixed blessing. Although each was familiar with economic 
concepts and accounting terminology, they were over-educated by comparison 
with the businessmen interviewed who had limited education and were in 
some cases illiterate. Our aspirations to the contrary, the businessmen 
sometimes proved uncooperative. It was clear that some, of them were bene-
fiting from technical assistance from;the local'RIDC and, in return, they 
' -treated- -t he-dn±erviewer_-c ordiali#_and ^openly. Others- were-oooperat i ve 
only to the extent that they thought the Center and the interviewer could 
provide then with a loan, A few were actually hostile toward the Center 
which, they asserted, hadn't done anything for them. Some businessmen, 
perhaps the better ones, felt that they could ill afford to take time 
away from their work to "chat" for two or three hours or more with an 
inquisitive, not obviously valuable (to them) interviewer. Some were 
suspicious of our motives. Finally, a large number of businessmen, even 
though willing to provide answers to our questions, were unable to do so; 
their, ac^ ajnlu^ g-"r^ txrrds--were~-in.coicplete or innaccurate and some had no 
records at all. They often relied on memory in responding to questions 
which called for quantitative replies. 
Out of some 120 firms selected, 105 interviews were completed 
and of these, some eighty-seven contained information sufficiently 
complete and consistent so that, in our judgment, it was reasonably 
reliable. 
The eighty-seven firms in cur san-ple are located in four regions 
of Kenya: Western Province. Nyeri District of Central Province, and Embu 
and Machakos Districts of Eastern Province. Thirty-sin- different market 
centers are represented. (See Appendix, Table 1, for a complete listing 
of the 87 sample firms by type of activity and location). More than a 
third of the firms studied (30) were makers of furniture, a common type 
of/small-scale enterprise not only in rural areas but in the 'harambee' 
oij squatter industrial areas of Kenyan cities. Their products include 
household items such as chairs„ tables, cupboards, shelves and beds, 
d<^ uks and chairs for schools, and coffins. Another three firms, success-
ful in their carpentry/'furniture business, have expanded into house 
construction or household hardware sales: one also operated a sawmill. 
| \ Fifteen firms are engaged in metal working: tinsmiths who produce 
palils, drinking water containers, poultry feeding equipment, rain gutters 
1 ; 
(for Jioiises), oil lamps and the like; "oj ".cksmiths who produce charcoal 
stoves, farm implements, hand tools, or virtually anything that can be 
handcrafted from iron cr steel, or a combination of both. A few of the 
more innovative entrepreneurs among the metal-working enterprises have 
extended themselves to production of new (for Kenyan rural industry) 
products: stee/ window frames for Loue-es cr comrncerial buildings, metal 
furniture, ox carts for rural cartage., or water tanks for collection and 
/ 
\ 
- u -
\ 
\ 
storage of rainwater run-off from sheetmetal-roofed houses. (The latter 
provides a supply of safe drinking water .) Most of these expanded firms 
continue to produce their basic line of traditional metal products but 
in a few cases, classified elsewhere in our sample, the firms have given 
up their original activity entirely. 
Virtually all of the wood- or metalworking firms engage in repair 
work. In addition, a total of t'W|pty-one firms in our sample were classi-
fied as repair or servicing enterprises. Nine of these firms combine 
metal- or woodworking with repair services which have become their major 
source of revenue; one has given up his original blacksmithing to deal 
exclusively in bicycle and general repairing. Eight repair firms, which 
clearly did not-emerge from former handicraft enterprises, service 
automobiles, trucks, tractors or bicycles; three firms provide sales and 
servicing of bicycles and radios. 
Our sample included six sawmills producing cut timber and, in 
some cases, millwork such as doors and door frames or windows and window-
frames. The remaining twelve firms in the sample include two shoemakers, 
a baker, two tailors (one of whom retailed products from Nairobi as well as 
his own), a maize miller, a photographer, a printer, a maker of cement 
building blocks, a mattressmaker, a dry cleaner, and an ox cart producer.* 
Ill 
Despite the comparative neglect of small-scale enterprise by 
Kenya's development planners, this sector of the economy appears to be 
growing at an accelerating rate. Only 8 firms of our sample, less than 
10%, were in existence before the "emergency" of the 1950's; most of these 
were owned by Asians and have since been taken over by citizens. Another 
lU firms were established in the six years prior to independence in 19&3. 
(See Table 3.) Twenty-six firms, 30% of the sample, were established in 
the last six years of the 1960's and 38, kb% of the total, were established 
in the 3g years from 1970 to mid-1973 when the field work for this study 
was done. This growth cannot be a consequence of public policy. The 
Rural Industrial Development Centers have not been functioning long enough 
to have had a noticeable impact; the Kenya Industrial Estates, established 
to promote small-scale enterprise, have concentrated on urban firms in 
* The descriptive statistics of our study confirm and extend the findings 
of Inukai and Okelo. See their "Survey of Rural Enterprise in Nyeri 
District, a Report to DANIDA", 1972. See also, I. Inukai, "Rural Industrial-
ization in Kenya: A Country Study", a paper prepared for Meeting on Rural 
Industrialization, Bucharest, September, 1973, United Nations Publication 
(ESA/SD/AC.5/6). 
the Modern Sector of the econony. Indeed, public policy has "been, more 
by accident than design, a deterrent to growth of rural small-scale 
industry. 
Inukai's study of licensing practices for small-scale firms 
has shown that the law discriminates against those firms which are 
unable to meet production standards or working conditions prescribed by 
i 
laws designed by the former .'colonial government to exclude native Kenyans 
from manufacturing enterprise.* Further, the business license fees charged 
seem quite arbitrary if not discriminatory, bearing no obvious relationship 
to the income earning capacity of firms. Only one of the eighty-seven 
firms in our sample was unlicensed — one would expect a publicly financed 
agency like.an RIDC to deal only with legally operating enterprise. The 
one unlicensed firm, however, was required to pay shs 2/- per working 
day, roughly shs 600/- per year, for the right to continue his business.+ 
This tiny firm's "license" fee compares with shs ho/- to shs 200/- per 
annum paid for licenses by enterprises operating legally in the same area. 
This single example is consistent with the more numerous cases uncovered 
by Inukai in his enumeration of firms drawn from a much larger group. 
Building codes, established to meet aesthetic, architectural, v 
and engineering standards imposed by the former colonial government and 
based on British conditions, are excessive in comparison to the technical 
needs Of enterprises and create an impediment to entry and growth. Our 
study did not, of course, indicate how many potential firms had been 
excluded' by lack of access to facilities (or licenses) but it did reveal 
some insight into the impact of these laws. Forty-one firms occupied 
"permanent" strixctures, built in accordance with legal standards. (See 
Table 8.) Another 28 occupied "semi-permanent" quarters constructed of ! < 
wood, mud or sheet metal; these buildings provided adequate shelter for 
equipment and for workers but they failed to meet legal standards set 
for buildings or for working conditions. Firms in the vicinity of those 
j i included in our sample and utilizing similar facilities were being closed i \ • down, 'slowly but systematically, to make way for "modernization". 
' \ ' " 
* See I. Inukai, "Legal-Framework for Small-scale Enterprise" in F.C. 
Child and M. Kempe (editors) Small-scale Enterprise: Nairobi: Institute 
for Development Studies, Occasional Paper No.6, 1973, pp 88-99. 
\ \ 
+ We were told that the payment wertt-tio the Urban Council. 
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A major concern of the particular entrepreneurs whom we interviewed was 
the uncertainty of their business existence and a quest for an alternative 
location for their vork. (See Table 2.) The problems were proportionately 
greater for those 16 firms which occupied "temporary" facilities made 
from salvaged lumber, sheetmetal or other material and which, in appearance, 
are akin to the sqiatters' homes frequently seem in Hong Kong, Karachi, or 
I I 
in the barrios of'some Latin American cities. 
/ 
At least half of the firms in our sample faced the proseect of 
acquiring new, more expensive buildings, of moving beyond the jurisdiction 
or attention of the local authorities (and probably that of their customers 
too), or of closing their businesses. In a number of cases, there was an 
olrvious need for sanitary facilities, water and sewage, for the benefit 
of the workers and for protection of society at large. Other than this, 
however, we could/not find evidence of unduly high social cost inflicted 
on society b^ the existence of these "sub-standard" buildings • They might 
possibly offend aesthetic standards of the elite but that is a matter 
outside the concern of most Kenyans. On the other hand, higher cost 
facilities would surely mean less income for producers, higher cost for 
their products which are sold primarily to low income consumers, or both. 
It would joe a pity indeed, if contrived, unnecessarily high building 
standards should delay or limit the opportunity for lower income groups 
to shar$ in the incipient economic growth of the nation. 
IV 
The products offered by rural small-scale industry in Kenya are 
not the sort that would sell readily in the markets of London or New York 
nor to high income consumers in Kenya. But similar firms do produce and 
sell similar products for the benefit of lower income consumers in 
Nairobi or other urban centers of Kenya. These products are, using the 
economists' jargon, "inferior goods". This unfortunate term does not 
necessarily mean that the quality of the good is inferior, although it 
njight be; the technical definition of an inferior good is "one purchased 
py consumers in lower income brackets for which there is a higher price 
/substitute purchased by higher income-consumers". The implication is 
/ that demand for an inferior^'good declines as incomes rise. The world 
economy is replete with examples: grain as a staple in the diet is usually 
1 . 
I 
- 7 -
; / 
! 
1 replaced in part by poultry3 meat or dairy products as economies grow,* 
/ A curious example from a very affluent society is the Volkswagen, demand 
for which declines as consumers become rich and substitute the Mercedes 
as a means of transportation. 
/ As Kenyan economic growth proceeds, one may expect that the 
Simple handmade furniture, currently selling in a growing market, will be 
replaced by factory-made articles finished to a high gloss after 
construction by specialized,skilled craftsmen using modern and efficient 
( ' . . j. i i 
woodworking machinery. Similarly, the handmade clothing and shoes will 
be replaced by factory and machine-made articles while the charcoal stoyes 
of the blacksmith will disappear in faVor of modern cookers. Rural maiae 
mills will disappear as consumers buy their maize, already milled, fromj 
provision stores; ox carts will disappear in favor of lorries or auto- '• 
mobiles and water tanks will be replaced by modern water systems. But \ 
all of this will surely be a long time coming. Economic .growth and the ! 
achievement of affluence is a slow process and will take, literally, 
i i k' generations. The market for "inferior goods" will be with us in the , 
meantime. Indeed, it may be expected to grow. As the econoiny develops and 
the presently poor achieve higher incomes, they will be replaced on the 
income scale by the presently very poor who will become less so. Since 
there are more of the latter than the former we may expect that, for-the . 
foreseeable future, there will be an expanding market for the products of 
the firms under study here. 
j At .'the present stage of Kenya's development, the products 
/ I offered might well be considered "superior". The clothing offered by 
tailors and the shoes offered by cobblers, rather crude when fudged by 
sophisticated Nairobi standards, are nonetheless a major improvement over 
traditional clothing and footwear and are clearly revealed as'preferred by 
those who-'buy them. The traditional banda made of mud smeared on a wooden 
.vframework is beginning to yield to homes of wood, brick or stone; the 
thatchfa roof is being replaced by sheet metal or even tile; and windows 
now appear -with steel frames. The simple bed produced by small furniture 
Shops is rapidly replacing the traditional "built-in" bunks of traditional 
bandas. While these new things, too, -will passj they may be expected to 
/ 
/ ; 
* The proportion of grain in the average consumer diet might well be used 
as an index of the level of economic development or well-being of world 
economies. 
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sell for years to come. That they currently sell in an expanding market 
is indicated by the businessmen's estimate of their own economic position; 
the overwhelming majority of those interviewed reported that their profits 
were satisfactory to good, and rising. (See Table 10.) The rapid, 
accelerating growth of the number of enterprises is a prima facie case that 
the sociaL-and -private product of capital invested in the enterprises is 
favorable. The limit on growth is not the market but, rather, the supply 
of labour skills and of entrepreneurial talent. 
Those who thoughtlessly inhibit or overtly deny growth of the 
output of these "inferior good" industries, those Kenyan policy makers 
who insist on European standards only for housing, furniture, and clothing 
are, in effect, limiting the benefits of economic growth to the privileged 
few. They would deny access to a modest but improved living standard for 
the mass of the population.* For a newly developing economy, consumer 
choice limited to highest quality and cost standards or none, usually 
means the latter for the bulk of the population. 
V 
Our study provided limited evidence that infrastructure 
investment in Kenya would have a salutory effect on the Intermediate Sector 
About one-third (31) of the firms use electricity provided by East African 
Power and Lighting. (See Table 20.) Another eight firms use petrol or 
diesel fuel to generate their own electricity and one firm, a sawmill, 
used a petrol engine to drive its machinery. The latter nine firms and a 
majority of the thirty-nine firms which reported no source of power at all, 
indicated a desire for access to regular electrical service. About half 
of the complaints about machinery were related to lack of power. Several 
firms,- in anticipation of extension of East African Power's service to their 
area, had purchased power driven equipment. Their particular expectations 
have been disappointed — in a some cases for more than two years — and 
the power equipment remains unused, collecting dust and rust. . .. -
The most frequently mentioned complaint of the firms jB^udied was 
with respect to transport, lack of good roads or access to service of 
common carriers. (See Table 2.) At .least part of the numerous complaints 
/ - " • 
* They are eligible for membership in the "Marie Antoinette School of 
Economics" whose motto, coined by its founder, is "l^ t- Them Eat Cake." 
/ 
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about access to raw materials was based upon distance from the source of 
supply. Some firms had purchased their own transport, equipment but, for 
small enterprises, access to frequent and reliable service by common 
carrier would be more economical. More and better roads, together with 
availability of electricity, would cut costs and raise the productivity 
l of the workers of the firms studied. 
/ 
I " 
i 1 .• / ' VI 
i 
Like petty enterprise everywhere, most of the firms in our sample 
(59) were individual proprietorships; another 27 were owned by two or a very 
few partners. (See Tables; 4 and 19). One firm is a cooperative with 99 
members.* Eleven of the:partnerships, the result of mergers of previously 
existing enterprise, are almost exactly offset by the 12 proprietorships I . 1 . that survive ^terminated partnerships. There is no example on our study 
of a limited company. 
Fcjr all firms save three, the owners participate in the daily 
I . 1 • 
affairs of the enterprise; in seventy cases they share in the actual 
production work. (See Table 5.) 
Seventy-seven of the owner/managers interviewed asserted that 
they were literate,.thirty-eight in Swahili and their tribal language and 
another thirty-nine in english as well. (See Table 16.) These claims 
seem excessive in comparison with the level of schooling indicated for 
the same people. (See Table 17.) Only twenty-three said they attended 
secondary school; another twenty may have, attended primary school long 
enough to achieve functional literacy (standard 5?). 
/ i 
Other formal training which contributed to preparation for a : I-
business career includes 11 casesi of study in a technical school, three 
persons attended the Kenya Industrial Training Institute at Nakuru, and 
two attended village polytechnics. (See Table 18.) Students of penology 
and rehabilitation will be pleased to know that one businessman in our 
group acquired his; skills at the Kenya Prison Industries. All of this 
suggests that formal training has been significant but only for a minority 
of the entrepreneurs contacted. Table 15 reveals that experience is, 
quantitatively, the most important teacher. Fifty-two owner/managers were 
* This firm is a tribute to the organizing ability and capital-raising 
ingenuity of one man. Sis activities will be discussed below, see p. 16. V \ 1 I' 
\ 
- 10 - v 
V 
engaged, in wage employment! as their occupation prior to going into 
business for themselves. Our study did not reveal the particular source 
of training of the twenty businessmen who were engaged in another 
business prior to establishing their present firm. : 
\. . V* • 
Some of our entrepreneurs spread themselves quite thin: forty 
owner/managers (b6%) also participate in another bsinessi thirty-seven 
(b2%) have shambas on which they assist, at least seasonably. v • 
/ None of this suggests that entrepreneurial talent is abundant.s 
On the/contrary, a public policy to promote entrepreneurial spirit and 
to develop. entrepreneurial talent would be desirable; Regrettably, 
there is no neat or easy answer to the question of how this' may be 
accomplished. However? two rather general suggestions come to mind. The . 
first is to strengthen the technical schools and to increase their 
attractiveness to primary school leavers. The present academically 
oriented secondary schools, with programs designed primarily for univer-
sity-bound students, clearly do not and cannot provide many young people 
with a practical education. And those who drop out of the program tend 
to be stigmatized. We propose a program to upgrade the curriculum and 
the faculty of the technical schools together with a public education 
(propaganda?) program which emphasizes the advantages of a technical 
education. The former calls for increased expenditure, on equipment and 
faculty, to parity or better with counterparts in ordinary secondary 
schools. The latter would include a public information program about the 
income opportunities available in "practical" jobs, especially from 
productive enterprise, together with pufblic policy statements about the 
need for such contributions to the groVth of the Kenyan economy. This last 
would enhance the status and prestige of business, money-making activities. / i . 
A second policy proposal is to upgrade and extend on-the-job 
training and apprenticeship programs, Something that can be done at relatively 
small cost to the development budget but which should yield good returns. 
Such programs 'are the primary sources of small-scale businessmen and, as 
we shall see later, of trained labor. Business enterprise which will 
offer such training both in production and management could, if they meet 
certai- standards, have their programs '"officially certified" and thereby 
become eligible for technical assistance and, possibly, direct money 
subsidies from a special government agency set up for that purpose. It 
seems likely that management and labor development programs could be 
pertly underwritten, with funds ana personnel, by a foreign development 
- 11 -
assistance agency. Some sort of public funding is almost certainly 
necessary to offset the bias against privately-financed training 
programs whose worker/beneficiaries, in the absence of indentured 
servitude, are permitted and even encouraged to leave their positions 
to strike out on their own once they have been successfully trained. 
VII 
yhe age composition of the firms in our sample, assuming that 
/ 
these fira^ s are reasonably representative, suggest that business entry 
into the Intermediate Sector is easy. (See Table 3.) Other evidence 
points to/the same conclusion. We have already noted that the firms are 
very sma^l. (See Tables ^,59 and 19.) The technological knowledge 
required; of the would-be business man is modest; sixty-seven of the 
fabricating firms in the group reported that they copied both the product 
and the technology from another, existing enterprise — although two firms 
reported receiving product-design assistance from a Rural Industrial 
Development Center. For entrepreneurs engaged in servicing or repair work, 
all that is required is to learn the trade, accummulate a little capital 
and to have the temerity to risk going it alone. While it is likely that 
the firms would operate more efficiently or more profitably with better 
educated managers, formal education requirements have not thus far imposed 
a serious barrier to entry. (See Tables IT and 18.) 
Moreover, the initial capital requirements are very modest. 
(See Table 22, line 1.) The modal amount of initial investment among 
firms in cur sample was shs.500/-; shs.1,000/- was enough for 50^ of the 
firms to get started and 75% of all firms needed less than shs.h,000/- at 
entry. The average amount of initial investment, shs.7,960/-, overstates 
the case because the mean is more than proportionately affected by those 
firms in the sample with extreme values, one of which began with an 
investment of shs.85,000/-.* 
As indicated in Table 6, personal saving was the normal source 
of capital funds at the time of establishment, supplemented in twelve 
cases by loans. (See Table 25.) With the notable exceptions of the loans 
from the ^ ocally-based Joint Development Loan Boards (JDLB), loans made 
at the time of establishment were made to firms with relatively large (for 
the sector,under study) capital requirements. Two loans from private 
' ' • « • 
* A takeover^ from an Asian. 
\ 
\ 
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individuals were made by non-citizen sellers of well-established but 
Kenyanized enterprise. The commercial bank and Industrial and Commercial i :. 
Development Corporation (ICDC) loans were made to firms located in the 
urban centers of the regions studied and, typically, promoted establishment 
of relatively large enterprises. . In each case the loan proceeds were 
used to purchase equipment consistent with the size of firm and production 
methods considered appropriate for the Modern Sector of the economy. 
Only the JDLB loans were small, directed to support of very small-scale i , . \ ' 
enterprise. 
On the other hand, the five ICDC loans and two of the three JDLB 
loans for new enterprises, were made in Western Province, suggesting that 
these agencies ma3r;be trying to ameliorate regional imbalances in Kenya's 
economy. Casual observation leads one to believe that economic development I 
in Western Province is a step or two behind those portions of Eastern and 
Central Province included in our study. The latter contain more modern 
industry; improved housing is much more in evidence, e.g., stone construction 
steel window frames, or sheet metal roofs. The use of animal power and j • 
ox carts, for those who cannot yet afford tractors or lorries., if fairljr 
common in the Central and Eastern Provinces but hardly seen in Western Pro-
vince . Similarly, water tanks for catching and storing of rain water, 
fairly common in Embu, Machakos and Nyeri Districts, are just beginning to 
appear in Western Province. In at least one case, the zeal of the ICDC 
loan officer and the enthusiasm of a borrower combined in agreement on a 
large but disastrous, loan. Theloan proceeds were used to buy equipment for 
fabrication of large Water storage tanks for which the regional market was 
as yet insignificant. Although a few units of the firm's output are sold 
from time to time and a larger market may soon emerge, for the present the 
expensive equipment is rarely used, the loan is in default, and the i 
businessman relies on his traditional tinsmithing activities for survival. 
h \ 
I ' • ' I ' 
' 'VIII i \ 
Our data and our" impressions revealed,that capital for expansion, 
while hardly abundant, has not been critically scarce. The fifty-nine 
firms which ^omplained about a shortage qf equipment were essentially the same 
firms which/complained about lack of credit. (See Table 2.) Their complaints 
are belief, however, by the fact thjt seventy-two firms reported they had 
substantial .excess capacity, even though the\excess capacity estimates 
shown /n Table 22, lines 7 and 8, are almost certainly exaggerated. Excess 
/ 
capacity estimates were (Often made off-the-cuff by the owner/managers and r < 'i Vv ; s 
\ 
i \ 
« , : \ 
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were not consistent with, the conditions observed during our cursory 
examination of the enterprise, its equipment and premises. Nevertheless, 
excess capacity was evident and this fact together with others in the 
study, confirms our belief that complaints of credit shortages for 
financing acquisition of capital goods are exaggerated. 
Businessmen always complain about lack of credit, especially to 
survey-research workers; they often jump to the conclusion that a loan 
is one thing that a research worker might be able to assist them to obtain 
and so they register their complaint. Their view on this score is often 
reinforced by the fact that loans figure prominently in discussions with 
technical assistance personnel. Loans are relatively easy forms of 
assistance to grant and to receive; they are also easily counted and 
recorded for activity reports to higher authorities as evidence of doing 
one's job. Useful information with respect to product design, production 
technology, or management technique, on the other hand, is both more, 
difficult for a technician to give and for a businessman to accept,or 
implement. Experience in other countries, more or less confirmed by this 
study in Kenya, suggests that if an enterprise is profitable and if the 
manager is reasonably aggressive and inventive, capital funds are frequently 
frequently — though not always — obtainable.* 
It was-agreed by all owner/managers interviewed that capital 
equipment is rarely available from suppliers on credit. Expansion of 
capacity was financed for all 87 firms by reinvested earnings, supplemented 
in 32 cases by infusions of savings generated from sources outside the 
enterprise itself. (See Table 7.) When the firms' own resources proved 
inadequate, loans for expansion were floated by 23 firms, about one out of 
four in the sample. As was the case for loans at establishment, the 
largest expansion loans to the larger firms were made by ICDC; the smaller 
loans to the smaller firms were made by JDLB's. All ICDC loans and JDLB 
loans, and the majority of commercial banks loans, financed equipment or 
building purchases. (Twenty-three out of 32 firms which owned their own 
buildings paid cash for them.) Even working capital loans, if any, were 
secured by' the borrowers' building or equipment. There was no example of 
an unsecured loan, for either establishment or expansion of a firm. 
* See for example, F.C. Child and PI. Kaneda, "Prelude to the Green 
Revolution, a Study of Small-Scale Industry in the Pakistan Punjab", 
, EDCC, forthcoming. (Working Paper No.11, Department of Economics, 
-University of California, Dams.) 
\ 
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curiously, and in contrast to the case of loans at establishment, 
there is not a single expansion loan, from any source, to firms in Western 
Province and only one example in Machakos District. Virtually all firms 
receiving expansion loans were located in Nyeri or Embu regions*. This •(?» 
fact may reflect regional discit-zination coraetines..allered-b7 politically 
active Kenyans. Alternatively, it may reflect the development lag in the 
i 
neglected regions, a fact about which there is fairly wide consensus. 
Whether the absence of loans to lagging regions is a cause or an effect, 
is a debatable question. 
' We were also interested to observe that two-thirds of all 
commercial bank loans for expansion were made in the Embu region, 
suggesting either responsive or aggressive banking practices in that area. 
In a country in which authority is normally centralized, junior officials 
hesitate/to exercise independent judgement, discretion, or to accept 
responsibility. It is easier to take no action than to risk the criticism 
and retribution that follow an action which might prove to be mistaken, 
i.e., better no loan than to risk a bad loan. It appears that some banker(s) 
in the Efabu area feel differently. 
IX 
! The term of loans is typically short: up to five years for ICDC 
loans, three years for JDLB loans, and two years for commercial bank loans. 
Such shbrt terms are normal, especially in a newly developing country 
where capital investment is not very ''deep'', where the "recoupment period" 
of the borrowers is also short. 
i The usual stated interest rates for loans from commercial banks 
and the ^ CDC were 8.5?-. to 9. 5< t for .JDLB loans the most often quoted rate was 
6.3%. In a number of cases, however, the firms in our sample provided us 
with a repayment schedule and, after a little calculation, we discovered 
that the real, effective rate of interest on loans was different: as low 
as b.5% in one case, but in more cases, the calculated rate ran to 12^, 
17% and 2Q% or more. (See Tables 25 and 26.) 
i 
Unfortunately we discovered this phenomenon too late in our 
study to ^erify it for all firms receiving loans or to recheck the 
reported oases. It is at least possible that some of our respondents 
provided-Us with innaccurate information. Moreover, we are informed that, 
at least for commercial banks loans-, bank policy requires that the stated 
and the effective rates of interest shall be the same, i.e., interest is 
- 15 -
paid, on the actual declining balance and the repayment schedule is set up 
to armortize the loan at the stated interest rate over the period of the r 
loan.* Nevertheless, the monthly payments and the term reported by several 
borrowers, on loans from both official and private lending sources, imply 
an effective interest rate different from the stated rate. Further, 
several firms reported;that at the time of loan disbursal, an immediate 
partial repayment was required so that the net loan proceeds fell short 
of the face amount of the loan. In effect the loan was immediately 
discounted, raising the effective rate of interest. Even allowing for 
reporting errors, the frequency (and sincerity) of these reports led us to 
believe they were true. (We cannot discern any reason for respondents to 
mislead us on this point.) 
It is possible that ICDC or JDLB policy permits or requires 
loans to be offered at a discount. But if discounting of loans or 
initial charges for making loans are contrary to official policy, it is 
possible that loan officers are demanding such pa:/ments as kickbacks in 
return for loan approval; similarly, monthly payments set above the amount 
necessary for amortization at the stated rate may reflect extra-legal 
payoffs. If the reported practices are contrary to official policy of the 
lenders, if loan officers are violating the rules for personal gain, they 
could be detected by careful auditing proceedures. Both practices are 
common among lending agencies in the developing world where actual 
interest rates are set below the equilibrium, market-clearing rate. Loan 
rationing makes such practices both possible and rewarding. 
In addition to the practice of advance loan repayments, which 
raises the spectre of kickbacks to loan officers, we found other evidence 
of malfeasance in the lending process. One loan recipient alleged that he 
obtained his loan only after agreement to purchase his capital equipment 
and to buy his raw materials from sources specified by the loan officer, at i 
prices above the normal market. 
The businessmen who reported discounting or tying of their loans 
were not-complaining; they accepted these practices as facts of life. 
Others, however, spoke with some bitterness about their inability to obtain 
any loans through normal channels, asserting that loans were available only 
i 
on a discriminating basis and that, lacking proper connections, they were 
/ 
* A colleague, J.D. Von Pischke, who is doing a study of rural credit, 
verified this policy with officials at the Nairobi headquarters of a 
commercial bank. 
/ - -
/ 
effectively discriminated out pf the market. This is a common type of 
complaint among those who fail to obtain loans, sometimes a just 
complaint but often a rationale or an excuse to explain their own failure 
to qualify for a loan. The justice of the complaints of unsuccessful 
/ 
loan applicants is difficult to determine but, in some cases, suspicion 
is hard to avoid. One loan applicant was notified, after months of 
delay, that his file had been forwarded to a field officer for verification 
and evaluation but the file/could not be found at the field office nor, -
upon inquiry, at the main office. After further'.months of delay the 
applicant provided his own file copies of the papers — which represented i! •< a heavy investment in time-and effort for a small'.firm — and these 
papers too disappeared into the maw of the bureaucracy. This story, if 
true, is an example of eitjher monumental incompetence by the lending agency 
or, possibly, a failure of the loan applicant to recdgnize an invitation i 
to appease the venality ofjthe loan officer. 
Our study yielded more optimistic, successful, and happier 
examples. Individual initiative and effort can accomplish remarkable 
things even in the face of adversity. The cooperative firm in our study, 
for example, was originally organized to agglomerate a group of carpenter/ 
furniture-makers into sL more effective whole. The enterprise was success-
ful and profitable but lit needed capital funds for expansion and modern-
ization. Efforts to obtain a loan from private commercial or official 
government sources were rebuffed. The coop manager then hif'upon the 
idea of opening the business to investment by new shareholders whose !; t 
contribution would beifunds but not participation in day-to-day production 
or management. When Coop membership reached 100, admissions 'were closed 
even though a queue of potential investors remained. With the capital 
lj . \ 
thus raised, and with advise and counsel from a Rural Industrial Develop-
ment Center, this profitable firm has acquired new facilitiespurchased 
better equipment, and expanded its operations to new but related lines t 
of business. ; ' i v 
Another less spectacular but no less interesting anecdote is the 
case of a carpenter employed by a furniture maker. He saved enough of his i i 1 wages to purchase the minimal equipment and supplies for production of 
cement building blocks. He hired five employees who worked in an open 
field (but under a tree) and he was in business for himself. His: cement 
block output sold readily and the entrepreneur soon invested his profits v 
in building and equipment to establish his own furniture-making enterprise. 
He continues to supervise his cement block firm but soon must leave the 
job with his original employer — to manage his projected hardware shop. 
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X 
As indicated above., loans for capital equipment are sometimes 
available; working capital loans are more difficult to obtain and from 
all reports, working capital is a more binding constraint. There were 
65 complaints about availability of raw materials (see Table 2) and 
probing revealed that these Were usually associated with limited avai-
lability of cash or transport. For most firms, only limited amounts of 
raw materials could be purchased at any one time and this entailed high 
unit price plus high transportation cost. Only twelve firms reported 
that they could obtain raw materials on credit from suppliers. 
On the other hand, 56 firms reported that they were willing to 
sell on credit and had accounts receivable outstanding at the time of 
the interview. (See Table 22, lines 3 and k.) Called upon to extend 
credit but unable to receive it exertfe a working capital squeeze which 
few firms in our study can afford. Actually, most of the small enterprises 
limited their credit sales and their bad debt losses were trivial. The 
examples of large credit sales were cases of firms which sold to government 
or quasi-government organizations: uniforms, building materials, or 
furniture sold to local government units for use in public office buildings, 
schools, hospitals and the like. These organizations rarely pay cash on 
delivery and never pay in advance. Participation in this market, perhaps 
a fairly large one from the standpoint of firms in our study, depends upon 
a willingness to sell on short-term credit. Unfortunately, short-term 
credit to governmental units frequently becomes long-term credit. The 
large sums of accounts receivable referred to in Table 22 are, mostly, due 
from governmental units or government-related entities. 
Probably the most interesting and unfortunate story in this 
connection is that of a young entrepreneur who worked for several years 
as an employee of a large firm in a metropolitan area. He returned to 
his home area with his accumulated savings and established a metal-working 
firm, capitalizing on his acquired technical skills and his natural entre-
preneurial talent. He started by producing some of the traditional 
products of metal-working firms but soon was marketing steel window frames 
and metal furniture of his own design. His big chance came with a large 
order for windows and furniture for a building under construction by a 
local government unit. Although he fulfilled his contract to the apparent 
satisfaction of the buyer, he has been waiting for months for payment. 
Meantime he lacks working capital to purchase raw materials necessary to 
continue his normal business activities. As a relatively new firm he has 
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no line of credit with raw material suppliers nor access to credit from 
a commercial bank. He supports himself and most of his five employees 
by doing repair and servicing work which requires few inputs purchased 
from other firms, but is also less remunerative. His once expanding 
enterprise barely survives. Similar stories, with less dramatic conse-
quences, are told in all the areas studied. 
One of the easiest, effective public policies to encourage 
small-pcale enterprise in rural Kenya is for governmental units to 
patronize them and, more importantly, to pay them promptly. Since local 
government units are in part financed by central government subventions, 
and since they are subject to certain procedural requirements set by the 
central government, it would be a relatively simple matter to mitigate 
this particular problem. Government regulations could be drawn to require 
prompt1 payment of purchase obligations; in the case of larger contracts, 
i ' 
provision for progress payments is appropriate. An alternative would be 
to permit or even to require discounting by commercial banks of certified 
i 
and endorsed government obligations. Government guarantees could absorb 
credit risk. To limit the cost of discounting their claims, the purchasing 
organization could be held responsible for interest payments beyond some 
period of, say, 60 days. 
1 H I • v '• ,f 
Government sales are substantial for only a small fraction of the 
firms in our sample. For most, and for the firms in the Intermediate 
Sector as a whole, government sales are not important. But access to 
working capital is. The most likely and convenient source of working is 
Kenya's commercial banking system and its numerous branches. There are 
(at least) three reasons for the absence of a healthy and contincus debtor/ 
creditor relationship between small-scale rural firms and commercial 
banks:/(l) lack of credit worthiness, (2) lack of knowledge, and (3) the 
high dost of administering very small loans. 
It \ i 
<i . 
ji Lack of creditworthiness, real or simply presumed, is understand-
able,,, Virtually all of the firms studied, or at least their present owner/ 
managers, are newcomers to business enterprise and have had no opportunity 
to prove their bona fides. Like bankers everywhere, Kenyan bankers are 
dubious about neophyte businessmen; they must prove themselves creditworthy 
before credit will be extended. For all practical purposes, a new firm 
must show that it does not need a loan before being judged eligible to 
receive one. 
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Some small firms -are unable to obtain loans because they lack the 
-knowledge of how to go about getting one. Otherwise creditworthy, they 
lack'information on procedures or the temerity to use them. Moreover, the 
typical banking staff is also inexperienced and does not aggressively 
seek loan outlets, certainly not among firms in the Intermediate Sector. 
1 ! • 
Presumably both creditworthiness and market information will 
improve with the passage of time. The process might be hastened by 
technical assistance personnel. The new and inexperienced businessman 
studied here, even when his operation is profitable, can usually use 
guidence on' organizational efficiency. They can also use advice on 
product quality and marketing; they need assistance on how to keep finan-
cial records and how to use them as a tool of management — and all the 
other factors which, in the judgment or rules of thumb used by bankers, 
attest to credit-worthiness, This sort of technical assistance, a real 
need,.''and not just something to please the money lenders, together with 
information and guidence about the intracacies of entering the money 
market are things which might well be provided by the Rural Industrial 
Development Centers. It is also something which they are currently ill-
prepared to do. Their present staff consists of production technicians, 
not managerial consultants. The latter should be added to their several 
staffs. Not only will small firms be better able to satisfy the bankers' 
loan criteria, business performance might be improved. 
Bankers assert,•correctly, that very small loans cost more than 
they £re worth; the interest received hardly covers the cost of- paper 
work involved in preparation and evaluation of the loan, disbursing and . 
collecting the funds. Excess administrative costs might well be borne by 
the government, at least until'the firms grow to a size and gain an-
experience rating which makes lending to them a profitable activity. The 
administrative cost of a loans surely not more than a few hundred shillings, I ' '"1 
might be paid directly to the commercial bank,lender by, say, the ICDC or 
the JDLB. But the loan'itself is best made by a bank at normal commercial 
rates. .' On the one hand the banks already have the machinery necessary to", 
issue, and collect loarls aiid its existence obviates the need for an 
additional bureaucracy.. On the other hand, the banks can operate on 
commercial principles and need not feel embarrassment-ir-portticai."or'' other- -
about enforcing collection, .__(Too many firms think of a government .loan 
as something which lis-given rather than a temporary use of funds which 
' i '•. 
must be repaid.) Finally, by using commercial channels a permanent, long-
term relationship can develop, one which will sustain itself without 
continuing government"subsidy; the relationship will be a commercial rather 
than an eleemosynary one, more durable and less susceptible to corruption. 
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XII 
If there was any douh± tferfc our-..study -concerns small-scale 
•en-t^n^is^, it should He dispelled by Table 2.3. The average employment 
of the firms in our samnle is 7.3, 6.3 of whom are production workers. 
Even these figures overstate the norm due to the presence of a few 
extreme cases of relatively large employment. Over three quarters of the 
firms employed five or fewer production workers and the modal number was 
three. 
Not much should be made of the skill classification of workers 
shown in Table 23. We accepted the owner/mangers' classification in 
each case even though we are auite sure that some workers classified as 
semi-skilled by one firm would be considered skilled by the standard of 
another, or vice versa. More interesting is the relative importance of 
apprentices in the total; "thirty firms, over a third of our sample, have 
on-going apprenticeship programs with, at the time of our survey, a total 
of seventy-two apprentices. Table 13 shows that all but two of the 80 
firms that replied -to our-Question about training, said that • 
acquired their skills on the job, in an apprenticeship -program, or with 
another firm in a similar business. In nineteen cases^he firm employed at 
least one worker with formal training at a village polytechnic, a technical 
I : J 
school, or the Kenya Industrial Training Institute but, it is clear, the 
industry provides its own.-training for the vast majority of its production 
employees. / 
The group also employed 90 non-production workers; in 52 of these 
cases the person involved is the owner/manager himself. Since virtually 
all owner/managers were active in the day-to-day activities of their 
firms, we were faced with the problem of how to classify them as production 
or non-production workers. With due recognition that we would make errors 
of judgment, we decided to classify the owner/managers as a non-production 
worker if his function as organizer and manager was mere critical than 
his role as a production worker. Thus, even though the large majority 
of the 52 owner/nsnagers classified as non- production workers also engage 
in production work comparable to that of their most skilled employees. 
and may even spend a majority of their time so engaged, we classified 
them as managers. In some 29 cases we classified the owner as a skilled 
production worker because his role, usually in the smaller firms, was 
essentially the same as th?t of the employee along side of whom he worked; 
his ownership role was primarily as supplier of capital and his management 
function was very limited. 
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Thirty firms employed a total of 38 other non-production workers. 
(See Tables 23 and 24.) Few firms could afford the luxury of a typist or 
secretary but 14 employed clerks, 8 employed bookkeepers and 8 employed 
supervisory or managerial personnel. The monthly wage of non-production 
employees ranged from a pittance of Shs. 40/- to a relatively) handsome 
Shs. 1,000/-. The medians for clerks, bookkeepers and supervisors were 
roughly similar to those of the various skill classifications.* 
XIII 
The range of monthly take home pay for production workers is 
also indicated on Table 24. Apprentices were typically paid very little 
or nothing at all. There is an ample supply of young men willing to work 
for nothing or for a small subsistence/in1exchange for the opportunity 
to learn a trade. Forty-seven firms, over half, supplemented wages with 
meals, shelter,.or clothing but we were unable to estimate the value of 
this payment in kind. Its existence means that cur wage data understate 
workers' incomes somewhat. Forty-six firms, predominately those located 
outside of the main District towns, typically released their workers to 
work on their shambas during the planting or harvesting seasons. A few 
of the firms in our sample worked very long hours. (See Table 22, lines 
5 and 6.) Although an. eight-hour day and a forty-five hour week were "normal", 
a few firms worked as much as a 12-hour day and a 72-hour week. The pay 
basis (see Table 9.) is mostly a time rate although 9 firms used piece 
rates only and another 19 used a combination of piece and time rates. 
Average monthly earnings of production workers in our sample: 
Shs 237 for' skiller workers, 
Shs 153 for semi-skilled workers, and 
Shs 104 for unskilled workers, 
* For the benfit of the Woman's Liberation Movement, who might suspect 
that there is discrimination against employment of women in Kenya, 
we note that we found only one case of a female supervisory employee 
in our sample. In the owner's normal absence, this lady virtually ran 
• . the firm, a medium-sized enterprise by the standards of our study. 
Her monthly wage was Shs. 150'/- significantly below that of any of 
the skilled and semi-skilled workers under her supervision and below 
the wage of other managers of comparable responsibility in the area. 
She was also a relative of the owner. 
\ \ 
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compare with the average monthly earnings in the modern sector, for 1972: 
Shs. 155 in agriculture, 
Shs. 414 in services, 
Shs. 636 in manufacturing, and 
Shs. 475 in all sectors * 
The comparision is favorable to small-scale rural industry only with respect 
to the agricultural sector of the modern economy. 
The comparison is somewhat more favorable, and possibly more 
relevant, if we eliminate the highly paid non-citizens from the modern 
sector data. In 1971, the latest year for which data are available, of 
all black Kenyans employed in the modern sector: 
19?? earned less then Shs. 100/- per month, 
34% earned less than Shs. 150/- per month, and 
48% earned less than Shs. 200/- per month.+ 
In contrast, the median monthly earnings of production workers in the 
sample vrere: 
' Shs. 220 for skilled workers, 
Shs. 150 for semi-skilled workers, and 
i 
Shs. 100 for unskilled workers. 
Small-scale rural industry comes off fairly well in this comparison, 
especially when we note that the Modern Sector data includes the income 
of all employers, higlv paid executive and professional personnel, as 
well as production workers. 
/ . . . • 
Equally important, the Modern Sector data are dominated by the 
relatively sophisticated, urban economies of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu 
which represent only a minority of the total Kenyan economy. Employment 
in this Modern Sector is net an option which is open to many; as a practical 
matter, only a minority of Kenya's rapidly growing labor force has a 
reasonable hope of employment in the Modern Sector.§ And most of those 
/ 
* Source: Government of Kenya, Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic 
Survey, 1973, p.142. 
+ Source: Government of Kenya5 Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical 
Abstract, 1972, p.229. 
$ See my "Employment, Technology and Growth - the Role of the Intermediate 
Sector, in Small Scale Enterprise; Nairobi: Institute for Development 
Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6, April 1973, pp.6-18 
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who do will face the problem of finding housing in the burgeoning ghettos of 
the city, probably separation from their families, and accommodation to the 
higher cost of living in the city. For the majority, the alternative is 
agriculture, hopefully commercial agriculture, or the intermediate sector. 
The latter is at least as rewarding as commercial agriculture and certainly 
more rewarding than continued occupation in the traditional sector. 
Table lU indicates that the vast majority of firms, 8U of the 
86 that responded to the question, recruited workers from within their 
local district. Twenty of these firms supplemented their labor force by 
at least one worker recruited from outside their district. The businessmen 
in our sample ranged in age from 23 to 55 which is, curiously, almost exactly 
the age group found to be most mobile in Kenya. That is, the age group 
from the low twenties to the low fifties is precisely that which migrates 
during working years. This group doubles the age-specific sex ratio in the 
areas of in-migration and cuts it in half in areas of out-migration. When 
they go to the city they bring a variety of social and political problems.* 
Since migration is clearly a function of employment opportunities per 
capita, one may predict that growth of rural, small-scale industry would 
help ameliorate the problem of migration and crowding of the cities. 
XIV 
Nine firms in our group provided space for "verandah" workers. 
This a device whereby a self-employed craftsman rents space for himself 
(and possibly for another worker or two in his employ) on the premises of 
a licensed firm. The verandah workers pass as the lessor's employees. 
This system of sub-letting space contributes to the renting firm's revenue 
and circumvents building or licensing problems of some mini-scale enter-
prises, often those just getting started as independent businessmen. 
Verandah workers are not included in the employment figures discussed above 
but they are, we suspect, quantitatively significant in rural Kenya. 
XV 
The firms in our sample, in their small-scale way, are quite pro-
fitable. Table 27 is a frequency.distribution of gross profits. We did not 
deduct depreciation expenses nor debt service to arrive at a net profit 
figure. We neglected the former because estimation of capital consumption 
* I am grateful to my colleague, Bernard Wasow, for information on age 
composition of Kenyan migrants and for insights into, the relationship 
between age-specific sex ratios in different regions and availability of 
income earning opportunities. See his "Regional Inequality and Migration 
in Kenya>:. IDS Working Paper No. 125, October 1973. 
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is a tricky business at best; for the small firms in our sample, with 
their data limitations, it was virtually impossible to obtain consistent, 
sensible, and reliable figures. We neglected interest expenses because, for 
our purposes, the distinction between owned and borrowed capital is not 
our purposes, the distinction between owned and borrowed capital is not 
crucial to estimating total social return on capital — though it is 
important to the borrower and the lender. 
Gross profit is here defined as sales less the sum of wages 
(including wages of management), purchased inputs, rents and miscellaneous 
expenses. We obtained estimates on an annual basis by expanding the 
monthly-"figures given at the time of the interview — a choice of evils. 
On the one Jiand we found that most owner /managers were unwilling or 
unable to provide data on an annual basis; they felt more comfortable 
talking ^bout the current month. But then we had to convert to an annual 
basis by' expanding the monthly figures by the number of months of "normal'' 
operation during the year, again a risky business.* 
I Gross profit figures thus defined may still miss the mark. 
i # * Wage^ of management did not present a problem. For employed managers we us ] 
usecf the reported salary. For the majority who managed their own firms, 
we-accepted ..their reported monthly "drawing" if it seemed reasonable. For 
the remainder who reported that they took out of the business whatever I 
w£s "needed to live on" or whose reported salary was out of line, too 
high or too low in.comparison with others, we used a wage equivalent to 
their highest paid employee or the wage of management of other, similarly 
situated firms in the same region. 
/ Purchased inputs are almost certainly under-stated because we 
were not able to obtain useful figures on operating cost of vehicles. We 
almost/certainly missed, consistently, a number of minor miscellaneous 
expenses. On the other hand, our purchased input figures are too high 
because we did not deduct the (unknown) increase in stocks during the 
previous year. Finally, the figure for sales, and hence the figure for 
gross profits-, is-probably understated because our survey was conducted 
during May and-June which is a period of Seasonally low sales. 
* A number of firms closed down or cut operations to a minimum during 
planting or harvesting seasons; this was especially true in more remote 
areas. In a few cases we further adjusted our figures for purchased inputs 
; to allow for the non-representativeness of the interview month. 
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One cannot reasonable assume that these omissions cancel each 
other. It does seem reasonable that the errors and omissions will be 
reasonably consistent from firm to firm — with one exception: omission 
of transport operating costs will tend to over-state, consistently, the 
gross profit of those firms with transport equipment. Since the latter is 
related to size, in part, it is a source of bias, 
In short, our estimates, of gross profits should be considered 
just that, estimates. And with these caveats in mind, we note that the 
average annual gross profit of the firms in the sample is shs.38,890/-. 
(See Table 27.) However, 30% of the firms earned less than that figure; 
the distribution is very strongly skewed to the high side. Perhaps more 
representative is the median gross profit of shs.11,980/-. But even the 
median does not describe the situation fully; gross profits vary over an 
extremely wide range, from a high over half a million shillings to a loss 
of about shs.^0,000/-. Nine firms generate very high gross profits, over 
shs.100,000/- per year, respectable by any standard. Twelve firms show 
negative gross profits and another five have gross profits so small that, 
after allowance for depreciation and interest (if any) their net profit must 
approach zero or be negative. Almost one out of five firms appeared to be 
failing or on the margin at interview time. Still, four out of five are 
performing respectably and half of the group generates gross profits of 
shs.1,000/- per month or more. Comparing this figure with incomes in the 
modern sector (above, p.22 ) and remembering that wages of management-have 
been treated as sl cost, the owners of the firms in our sample are in a 
relatively high income bracket. 
Table 28 shows the gross profit data expressed as a percentage of 
the firms' investment in fixed capital. Again, the most striking characte-
ristic of these data are their variability. The gross rate of return 
ranges from a low of - 1,000$ to a high in excess of 5,000^ - extremes"msaially 
associated with the high labor-intensity of production in a few small 
enterprises. A few firms use a miniscule amount of capital so that their 
gross profit, as a percentage of capital, appears astronomical. Still, 
even after allowing for these extreme cases, there is a wide variation. 
Twelve firms '(about show negative returns; half of the firms earn a 
gross retjurn oh investment in excess of the median of lk3.3% and 15 (about 
17^) earn over Q00%. Perhaps the most meaningful figure'is the aggregate 
return on investment: the eighty-seven firms in" our study earned, gross, 
155.7% on a total investment in fixed capital of almost shs.2.2 million. 
Even if we allow an arbitrary (and' fairly high) 20% for capital consumption, 
the net return on capital is a generous 135$* 
• — - 26 " 
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If we include atocks in our capital base (see Table 29) the 
median rate--of" return is reduced to 75.1? and the aggregative return of 
all firms is Ilk.7% on a total investment of nearly shs.3,000,000/-. 
i. / if t 
J XVI' 
Private profitability is important, as an incentive to investment 
and entrepreneurship. More important fres the social point of view is 
the generation of income and employment associated with capital formation, 
i.e., the gross capital/output ratio (K/0) and the gross capital/labor 
ratio (K/L). The former indicates the capital formation required or 
associated with increments to the gross domestic product, assuming the 
'' . * - . availability of other primary inputs such as labour; the latter indicates ' t 
the capital requirements per new job created. 
We hav& used three different capital measures to calculate the 
ratios, K/L and K/0. Capital measure Ho. 1 is the firms' reported 
investment in fixed capital. This understates the capital requirements 
for those 56 firms which rent their premises. The estimated value of 
rented buildings 'is included in measure No. 2. We found it impossible, 
however, to ascertain the precise market value of rented premises so we 
assumed, not too' arbitrarily, that the value of buildings was ten times 
the annual rental. This may be an understatement of market value but 
not of construction'cost. Stocks are included in capital measure. No. 3. 
Stocks represent a necessary and legitimate social investment although we 
have some reason to believe that stocks are excessive for a number of .('.• • I. firms in our study.*, J. 
Estimated K/0 and K/L ratios for all firms, calculated three 
ways,, are presented in Tables 30 and 31. Using capital measure No.. 3, .the 
largest, the ratios are: 
/ ( /' K/0 K/L ; 
Median j \ .^3 shs.3,646 
Aggregate, all firms 
shs.5,566 
Because of wide disparities in firm size, the aggregate ratios — total 
capital for all firms divided by total output and employment respectively — 
are the more, meaningful, figures. These statistics indicate that shs.U,U00/-
invested in firms like those studied will add shs.10,000 to the economy's 
* See my note on "Entrepreneurship and Management in a Society in Transition", 
P- 5i \ ! 
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annual output. Put another "way, capital invested in the inter-
mediate sector, when combined with other inputs (mostly labor) will yield 
over 225$ (before depreciation). 
Comparable figures for the modern, monetized economy are 
difficult to obtain. Kenya's 1970-7^ development plan included estimates 
of K/0 for a number of development projects in particular industries. 
These ranged from .71 in clothing to 8.79 in sugar with an average for all 
industry projects of 2.3*. Tobin estimated K/0 by sectors from the 
national accounts of I96U-7I. His estimates range from .hi in banking, 
insurance and real estate (the only sector with K/0 less than 1.2) to 7.35 
in electricity and water. The K/0 for all private sectors is 2.9+. Even 
allowing for a large margin of error in our estimates, investment in the 
intermediate sector has a substantial margin of social productivity over 
the modern sector. 
On the employment side, the investment per new job created in 
the group of firms studied (and using our highest estimate) is shs.5,566. 
Again, comparable figures for the modern sector are scarce. Rough 
calculations from the national accounts indicate that capital formation 
per job created was shs.65,000/- during the period 1968-71. The 
difference from K/L in our study seems outrageous and is almost certainly 
an inappropriate comparison because the former includes all sectors of 
the modern economy — services, utilities, and government — which have 
inherently high capital/labor ratios but are nevertheless important to 
Kenya's development and probably have a favorable impact on the productivity 
of capital elsewhere, including the.intermediate sector being studied. 
The only industry-specific estimates from the modern sector"that have come 
to our attention are those of Pack who calculated that the paint and 
§ textile industries, each had a K/L ratio of shs. lU,000/-." 
* Republic of Kenya, Development Plan, 1970-7^, Nairobi, 1969, p. 310. 
+ James Tobin, "Estimates of Sectoral Capital/Output Ratios for Kenya," 
Nairobi: Institute for Development Studies, Discussion Paper No.171, 
1973, p. 8. 
§ H. Pack, "Employment and Productivity in Kenyan Manufacturing," Nairobi: 
IDS Working Paper 5k,. August 1972. 
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On the "basis of this very limited evidence we venture to suggest that 
capital formation per job created in the modern sector is about three 
times that of the firms in our study. Put the other way around, investment 
in the intermediate sector would generate about three times as many jobs 
as a similar sum invested in the modern sector.* 
XVII 
From the K/0 and K/L statistics we can reasonably infer that 
the social productivity of investment in the intermediate sector exceeds 
that of capital formation in the modern sector — at least at the margin. 
We cannot conclude that massive re-direction of investment is indicated, 
for two reasons: First, much of the development budget is devoted to 
education, development of resources, extension of public services, 
utilities and infrastructure such as roads and sanitary facilties. The 
social productivity of these activities is very high and resounds favorably, 
though probably immeasurably, to the productivity of investment in all 
other sectors. These activities must needs continue. Secondly, K/0 and K/L 
are certainly not linear functions. That is, the intermediate sector can 
absorb new capital formation at a limited rate without a decline in both 
ratios. Investment can proceed and continue to have high yields and low 
cost per job only if complementary resources are available. Massive invest-
ment in the intermediate sector would eventually run into shortages of 
skilled workers and of qualified entrepreneurs. While we have no reason 
to think that supplies of these two types of manpower have been exhausted 
neither have we any reason to think they are unlimited; Indeed, the immediate 
bottleneck for Kenyan growth almost certainly lies in the supply of 
qualified manpower. In short, the indicated public policy is to shift 
emphasis and resources from the modern .sector to the intermediate sector 
and, simultaneously, to emphasize.those development activities which will 
increase supplies of skilled labor and entrepreneurship. 
* As this is being written, I have pondered the K/0 and K/L statistics. 
They look good; indeed, they look too good. With a bit of checking I have 
discovered that I failed to ask Mr. Griffing, who did the computer-
programming for statistical procedures, to deduct "purchases from other 
firms" from the output of the firms in the sample. The output figure 
used is gross output rather than value added. It is the latter which 
properly should have been used. The calculations will have to be done 
again and will be published in a revision of this paper. It should be 
noted, however, that no conceivable revision of the statistics to reflect 
purchases from other firms could raise K/0 to approach that ~nf the 
modern sector. 
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This discussion serves to recall and to emphasize the need for 
public programs and social policies designed increase the supply of 
entrepreneurship and to enhance labor skills. (See section VT above.) 
Introduction of manual training curricula in primary schools and aggran-
dizement of technical schools at the secondary level are indicated — 
if necessary at the expense of academic secondary schools, colleges and 
universities. Expansion of extension services by organizations like the-
Rural Industrial Development Centers and underwriting of apprenticeship, 
programs and on-the-job training would have a high social return and 
should be undertaken — even at the expense of more formal programs like 
Kenya Industrial Training Institute or Kenya Institute of Management. 
XVIII 
Tables 32 and 33 present a comparison of the profitability and 
social performance of firms which have received loans and those which 
have not. 
All 12 borrowers from commercial banks operate with a positive 
gross profit rate though one, at +lW t is close to the margin. The K/0 
and K/L ratios cover a fairly wide range in a small number of cases but 
all are reasonably close to the middle of the distributions for the whole 
sample, except for two firms with very high K/L ratios of 10,500 and 15,300. 
Official lending agencies (ICDC and JDLB) have tended to pick 
firms with less than' the median rate of return of non-loan receivers and 
less than the aggregate rate of return for all firms, but this observation 
does not necessarily imply criticism.* Presumably their function is to 
lend to firms which would not ordinarily qualify for a commercial loan or 
which are more than normally risky. They have picked five real losers with 
negative rates of return, one at -1015$ on invested capital. Another 
firm is marginally profitable at +lh.l%. There is some tendency for 
official agencies to pick firms with relatively high K/0 ana K/L ratios; 
of the latter, three are between 13,000 and 16,000. This may reflect a 
tendency to look favourably upon more capital-intensive (modern) 
technology when considering loan qualifications. Such was not the case 
for commercial bank lending. 
* Due to an error in my instructions for computer programming, k firms 
which received multiple loans, from both offial agencies and private 
sources, were omitted from the statistical summaries of Tables 32 and 33. 
This error will be corrccted in a revision of this paper. 
\ 
\ \ 
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Loans are available but not necessarily in the amounts or 
frequency desired. These data do not tell us anything about firms in need 
of Iqans, possibly creditworthy', but unable to obtain them. Our earlier 
discussion (see sections VII-X) suggested that loans at establishment were 
not:a major problem. Loans for expansions were somewhat more scarce and 
loans for working capital might be a special problem. At that point we 
recommended policies designed to promote loans by commercial banks to 
f^ rqis in the intermediate sector. (See Section XI.) Specifically, we 
recommended/th$t technical assistance agencies, in their efforts to 
promote better products, better technique, and better management' 
practices vould ipso facto improve profitability and creditworthiness. 
Further, assistance in setting up bookkeeping systems to record and to 
help management to control the flow of funds would, inter alia, demonstrate 
that creditworthiness exists. Finally, the most likely and effective vehicles 
i 
'for extension of credit to business firms are ordinary credit agencies; 
'i 
technical assistance personnel should introduce their clients to commercial 
banks and assist them in loan application procedures. 
, Commercial banks have singular advantages as credit agencies: t 1 ! 
their very existence obviates creation of an additional organization and a 
duplicate bureaucracy, they offer fewer opportunities for extra-legal 
practices, and they can establish a continuing, long-term relationship 
with the client. If necessary in the early stages, a subsidy to private 
lenders (and borrowers) would be appropriate and almost certainly less costly 
to the government than establishment and maintaincnce of another separate 
organization. From the limited data given above, we can now see that 
private lenders may have less bias, toward capital-intensive technology. 
Greater reliance on commercial banks may contribute to a lessening 
of the urban/rural imbalance, a problem which is attracting increasing 
attention of Kenyan development planners.* Commercial bank branches have 
been Established in ruralmarket centers all over Kenya. As incomes have 
begun- ib rise and the rural population has become familiar with banks, 
deposits\have risen. Loans in rural areas have not risen in proportion; 
the loan/deposit ratio of rural bank branches is low and falling. The 
vast majori% of bank loans are made in urban areas; the urban loan/deposit 
ratio can rise* The commercial banking system becomes, willy-nilly, the 
* I am told, in conversations with; officials at the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning, that this problem will receive increased emphasis in the 
forthcoming Fiv^-Year Development Plan. 
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instrument for transferring resources from rural to urban Kenya. A policy 
to promote loans in rural areas will slow, though probably not reverse, 
this phenomenon.* 
Loan funds have recently become available to the Rural 
Industrial Development Centers and the RIDC's are expected to supplement 
assistance to . . their technical/clients with direct loans. This is a most unfortunate 
policy, It-adds to the work load of an already understaffed agency and 
reduces the likelihood that their clients will contact ordinary credit 
channels. Moreover, combining the technical assistance and credit functions 
can only reduce the RIDC's effectiveness in the former, vastly more important 
role. 
Initially an RIDC client may be more receptive to advice if a loan 
is in the offing. He is attracted by the prospect of a relatively easy 
loan and will adopt, or at least appear to adopt, modes of behavior 
which portend a favorable loan decision. But once the loan is made, its 
very existence is deleterious to the relationship between the two parties. 
On the one hand, RIDC now has a vested interest in the success of the 
enterprise; to demonstrate the wisdom of its decision which has involved 
public funds, it must defend the enterprise and go to great lengths to 
insure its success. RIDC personnel may be tempted to participate in the 
firm's management, if that should prove necessary, to insure success or 
to correct a mistake. Loans from technical assistance agencies lead to 
disproportionate demands on the time and efforts of their personnel. On 
the other hand, as a loan collection agency the RIDC and the client become 
adversaries rather than allies. A debt collector is not a welcome visitor 
and when this role is played by technical assistance personnel, it creates 
frictions and exacerbates any previously existing tensions.+ Kenya should 
be reducing the number of official credit agencies, not increasing them. 
It certainly should not intermingle the credit and technical assistance 
functions. 
* I am indebted to J.B. von Pischke of IDS for information with respect 
to rural/urban disparities in the loan/deposit ratio. 
+ RIDC managers or technicians have sometimes been mistaken for emissaries 
from ICDC. As such they are assiduously avoided by owner/managers of 
debtor firms, especially if the loan is a bit in arrears. 
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XIX 
Our field study has revealed that small-scale rural industry 
is profitable; it provides a "better than average income to the Kenyan 
businessmen engaged. The rate of return on capital compares favorably 
vith Kenya's modern sector and with that of other developing economies. compares . 
The reward to labour, while not magnificent,/reasonably well with modern 
industry and very favorably with modern agriculture. Employment in the 
intermediate sector is certainly to be preferred to subsistence agricul-
ture or to unemployment, disguised or open; the latter are the only 
available options for a substantial portion ot Kenya's rapidly growing 
labor force. ; 
At the aggregative level, capital invested in the intermediate 
sector makes a larger contribution to natidnal product and creates more 
employment than does an equivalent amount of capital formation in the 
modern sector. \ I \ I 
Despite the (thus far) lack of public assistance, small-scale 
rural industry is growing at an accelerating rate &Qd, assuming that;our 
sample is reasonably representative, we may expect continued growth. 
Entry is easy; capital and technological requirements are modest. Capital 
for establishment of a business is available from private and personal 
! _ ft 
sources; capital for expansion can be drawn from reinvested earnings 
supplemented in some cases with loans. Working capital may become a 
problem. 
For the most part, both entrepreneurs and workers have been 
drawn from the .labor force of the modern sector or trained within the 
intermediate-sector itself. Limited supplies of entr'epreneurship and 
skilled labor for the expansion Of existing firms or establishment of new. 
firms are probable barriers to expansion of the intermediate sector.* 
For the short-run the indicated pu^Lic policy is to assist i 
existing firms with an expanded technical assistance program, promotion 
of on-the-job training, and encouragement of relationships with the " 
banking system. For the longer run, Kenj-a will' benefit from a shift of 
' I V . 1 \ 
* This is a topic to be discussed in my w®Tfc*«pi«eneurship and Management in 
a--Society._in Transition"-^ - TDS""Working Paper N0..12&. 
• I \ 
\ 
\ 
V 
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emphasis in the education system, from almost complete emphasis on an 
academic curriculum toward some manual training and technical education. 
We have found nothing to contradict our earlier, tentative 
conclusion: "....the Intermediate Sector offers a favourable return on 
scarce capital, generates productive jobs at a low investment perljob, 
utilizes saving not otherwise available, develops new skills at low cost 
to society — a combination hard to beat. It might even slow the rate of 
urbanization. A developing economy could hardly ask for more.*" 
* From my Employment, Technology and Growth — the Role of the Intermediate 
Sector", in Small Scale Enterprise, IDS Occasional Paner So. 6., 1973, 
p. 18. 
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Table 1 
Number- of Firms in Sample, by Region and Type of Product. 
Region 
Type of Product (s) Machakos Embu Nyeri Kakamega Total 
Metalworking, tinsmith 1 5 0 2 3 
Metalworking, iron 1 1 0 1 3 
Metalworking, iron «. and tinsmith 1 0 3 0 4 
Woodworking, furniture 4 6 10 10 30 
Automobile Repair 1 0 0 3 4 
Auto, cycle, general repair 0 0 1 3 4 
Cycle, radio repair plus sales 0 1 0 2 3 
Metal working, cycle and general repair 1 1 2 0 4 
Cycle and general repair 1 0 0 0 1 
Metal/wood working,Oxcarts, general repair 4 1 0 0 5 
Sawmill 0 2 3 1 r 0 
Furniture, house construction 1 0 0 0 1 
Furniture, hardware sales 1 0 0 0 1 
Furniture, hardware, sawmill, construction 1 0 0 0 1 
Tailoring 0 0 0 1 1 
Tailoring plus cloth retailing 0 0 1 A V 1 
Shoeraaking + Repair 0 1 1 0 2 
Baking 0 0 1 0 1 
Maize milling 0 0 1 0 1 
Photography 1 0 0 0 1 
Ceceat Building blocks 1 0 0 0 
Printing 1 0 0 0 1 
Mattress making 1 0 0 0 1 
Dry Cleaning 0 0 1 0 1 
Ox Carts 1 0 0 0 1 
22 IS 24 23 87 
Total 
No. of Market Centers 10 5 10 11 36 
Represented 
Table 2 
0ttn?x CoT.plrintr ox '£ hot ta gee' 
Complaint Number 
Transport 73 
Raw ^Jaterials 65 
Machinery, equipment 59 
Credit 59 
Building, Land, Legal Constraints 45 
Qualified Labor 44 
Technical Information 23 
Total 363 
' Table 3 
Year of Establishment 
Year Number Year 
IS 43 1 1964 
1948 2 j 1965 
1949 1 Ss 1966 
1950 1 ! 1967 
1951 2 j 1963 
1952 1 / 1969 
1953-56 0 1970 
1 9 5 7 1 9 7 1 
1 9 5 8 1 9 7 2 
1 9 5 9 1 9 7 3 
1 9 6 0 N o t indicated 
1961 
1 9 6 2 T o t a l 
1961 
\ " ' * 
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Table 4 
Form of 3usiness Organization 
Form of Organization Number 
Individual Froptfiatorship 5 9 
Family Partnership 13 
Non~Family Partnership 11 
Mixed Partnership 3 
Cooperative J-
Total 87 
Table 5 
Extent of Owner Participation 
Owner Participation Number 
-Supply of Capital Only 3 
Capital and. Management 13 
Capital, management, production work 66 
Varied (in partnership) 4 
Not indicated 1 
Total 87 
Table 6 
Source of Funds at Time of Establishment 
Source Mumber 
Personal Savings - wages or salaries 48 
Personal Savings - agriculture 12 
Personal Savings - another Business 14 
Personal Savings = not specified 7 
Personal Savings - wages plus agriculture 4 
Personal Savings - wages plus another business 2 
Total 87 
. 5 -
Table 7 
Source of Funds for Expansion 
Source Number 
Reinvested earnings 34 
Reinvested earnings plus savings from agriculture 21 
Reinvested earnings plus savings from wages elsewhere 3 
Reinvested earnings plus savings from other enterprise 6 
Reinvested earnings plus new shareholder 1 
Reinvested earnings plus savings from multiple sources 2 
Total 87 
Table 8 
Type of Building Occupied 
Type of Building Number 
Temporary building; "squatter" type 16 
Semi-Permanent; wood, mud, sheet metal 28 
Permanent; constructed to legal standard 41 
not indicated. 2 
Total 87 
Table 9 
Pay Basis for Employees. 
Pay Basis Number 
Daily rate 5 
Weekly rate 1 
Monthly rate 45 
Piece. Rates 9 
Monthly and piece rates 12 
Combination of different time rates and piece rates 7 
No response 8 
Total 87 
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Table 10 
Owner Opinion of his Business Profits 
Profits are: Number 
Satisfactory 
Good 
Permit Survival 
Negative 
Wo response 
Total 
Profits are: Number 
Rising 54 
Falling 6 
Stable 2 
No. response1' 25 
Total 87 
42 
24 
18 
1 
_2 
87 
Table 11 
Book-keeping Systems Used 
Number 
1. Cash 3ook 12 
2. Sales/Purchase Record. 2 v 49 
3. No. 1 plus No. 2 35 j 
4. No. 1 plus Inventory Record 1 
5. No. 1, No. 2, plus Inventory Record 14 (' ^ 
6. Complete accounting system 10 
7. No. 6 plus regular accountancy statements 2 
8. Not indicated 11 
Total 87 
Table 12 
Other Income - earning Activities of Owner/Managers 
Number 
32 
21 
8 
1 
25 
Another business firm 
Shamba 
Shamba plus another Business 
Wage' employment elsewhere 
None or no response 
Total 87 
.«=> 7 <=. 
Table 13 
Source of Workers1 Training 
Number 
1« On-the-job, apprenticeship, or with another firm 59 
2» No. 1 supplemented by village polytechnic 11 
3. No, 1 supplemented by "technical school" trainee 6 
4. No. 1 supplemented by KITI* trainee 1 
5. Ho. 1 supplemented by KITI and Village polytechnic 1 
6« Village polytechnic and KITI 1 
7. "Approved" technical-school and trade examination 1 
8. Not indicated 7 
Total 87 
*Kenya Industrial Training Institute 
.'-*•'- Table 14 
Source (Home) of Workers 
Extended family only 3 
Extended family plus local district 9 
Local District, no family 52 
Local District plus outside District 13 
Outside district 1 
All of the above 7 
Not indicated 2 
Total 87 
Table 15 
Owner/Managers' Previous Occupation 
Wage employment, similar business 34 
Wage employment, different business 18 
Another, similar business 12 
Another, different business 8 
Agriculture 8 
Teaching 3 
School 3 
Not indicated 
Total 87 
- 44 -
Table 16 
Owner/Managers1 Language and Literacy 
Vernacular and Swahili 
Vernacular, Swahili> EngLish 
Spoken 
46 
37 
Written 
38 
39 
More than three 2 cs 
No response 2 . 10 
Total 87 87 
Table 17 
Owner/ Ma nag ers® Schooling 
Years of Schooling: Number Years of Schooling Number 
Not indicated 10 7 - 2 
1 - 3 8 - 12 
2- 15 9 - 1 
3- 5 10 « o O 
4-. 11 11 - 0 
5- 6 12 - 2 
6- 12 Total 87 
Table 18 
Technical Schools Attended by Owners 
Number of Owners 
Village Polytechnic 2 
KIT I 3 
Technical School (government) 11 
Army 1 
Prison Industries 1 
Total 21 
Table 19 
Number of Owners per Firm 
Number of Owners- Number of Firms 
1 59 
I 2 16 I 
3 7 
4 2 
5 1 " 
6 1 
99 1 
Total 87 
Table 20 
Power Source 
Source 
None 
Electricity 
Generator (of Electricity) 
Gas (for welding equipment) 
Petrol 
No answer. 
Total 
No of Firms 
39 
31 
3 
4 
1 
4 
87 
Table 21 
Complaints About Tools and Equipment 
Complaint 
High Price 
Lack of servicing 
Poor Quality 
All of the abcrvo 
' Nimber 
20 
8 
6 
2 
Total 3fc 
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Table 23 
Labor Employed, by Skill Classification 
Mo, of firms 
Reporting 
• mm mmnk M* 
Production Workers 
Skilled 81 
ft 7 
32 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
All Production Workers 87 
Non-production Workers 87 
Employment per Firm 
Mode Median Low 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
5 
1 
2.7 
2.8 
2.3 
6.3 
1.0 
Total Employees 
Total 
High Workers Remarks 
24 219 1 fir- with no re than 10 
39 189 2 firms with 7 or more 
12 75 2 firms with 6 or more 
44 555 2 firms with more than 18 
9 90 
545 
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Table 24 
Workers Pay, Shillings per Month 
No« of Firms 
Reporting Low Mode Ked-*gfl Mean High 
Production Workers 
Skilled 81 100 200 220 237 600 
Semicskilled 67 50 150 150 153 300 
Unskilled 32 50 90 100 104 170 
Apprentices 30 0 30 30 43 120 
Non-Production Workers 
Clerks 14 40 150 = 360 
Typists 1 180 - 180 - 180 
Book-keepers 8 40 co 120 m 600 
Supervisors 2 270 - 285 €» 300 
Employed Managers 6 150 CO 245 ma 1,000 
Owner Managers 52 50 C3 190 mm 1,000 
O CO 
Table 25 
Loans at Establishment 
Source 
Private Individual (A) 
Commercial Bank 
I.C.D.C. (3) 
J.D.L.B. (3) 
Other Government (4) 
Total 
Number 
of Loans 
2 
1 
5 
3 
I 
Amount 
(shillings) 
Interest 
Rate (%) 
29 » 57,000 
20,000 20 
25 55,000 (2) 8.5-9.8 
2 - 4,000 5.5=6.5 
15,000 4.5 
Term 
(months) 
Indefinite 
18 
60 
24-36 
24 
12 
Notes: 
(1) These two loans represent the agreed purchase price of two firms 
acquired by cittz-ens under the Kenyanization policy. After initial 
payment, debt is amortized out of profits over an indefinite term at 
an unspecified interest rate. 
(2) Median and Mean loan size, shs. 50,000. 
(3) All I.C.D.G. loans and two- out of three J.D.L.B. loans made in 
Western Province. 
(4) National Bank of Kenya loan uade, apparently, on non-commercial 
terms. 
• 14 ° 
Table 26 
Loans for Expansion 
Mo. of Firms Amount Interest Term 
Receiving (shillings) Rate (%) (months) 
Source _ loans 
Gconcrcial Bank (1) (2) 6 2-15,000 (5) 7-
I.C.D.C. 4 • • 3-80,000 (6) 9.0. 
J.D.L.B. 8 . 3-12,000 (8) 6.5, 
Other Government (3) 1 3,000 7 
Com® 1 Bank + ICDC (4) 1 36,600 8.2 
JDLB + ICDC (4) 1 20,500 8.5 
Relatives + Com'l Bank (4> 1 6,000 12,0 
Com11 Bank + J.D»L.B (4) 1 14,000 15.2 
10.24 
36»60 (7) 
18-36 (9) 
24 
40 -
36 
• 36 
27 
Total - 23 
Notes: 
(1) One firm, not here enumerated, had unused overdraft facilities. 
(2) All firms, save one, located in one district - Embu. 
(3) Loan arranged by local Trade Development Officer with National Bank 
of Kenya 
(4) Two or more loans in each case. 
(5) Median = shs. 4,500; Mean = shs. 5,833 
(6). Median = shs,15,000; Mean = shs.28,750 
(7) All loans save one at 60 months 
(8) Median = shs. 5,000; Mean = shs. 5,563 
(9) Only three loans at less than 36 months* 
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Table 27 
Fir^pr' Grorr Profit, Annual 
Barir at Current i'ctivity Rate (1) 
(Shilling) 
Profit? or 
Lorrer 
More than Sbr. 10,000 lorsr 
Sbr* 10,000 to Sbr. 1 lor? 
f? 
Shr* G 
Sbr. 10,000 
Sb'f. 20,000 
Shr. 30,000 
Sbr. 40,000 
Shr. 50,000 
Sbr. 60,000 
Sbr. 70,000 
ShP-f 80,000 
She. 90,000 
• Shr. 9,999 
- Shr. 19,999 
- Shr. 29,999 
- She-. 39,999 
- Sbr. 49,999 
- Sbr. 59,999 
- Sbr. 69,999 
-Sbr. 79,999 
- Sbr. 89,999 
- Shr. 99,999 
Sbr. 100,000 - Sbr. 199,999 
Sbr. 200,000 and over 
2 
10 
28 
12 
7 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
2 
4 
5' 
F = 87 
Xfof Clarr 
- 28,240 
- 1,740 
+ 4,624 
• 15,385. 
23,188 
35,861 
41,600 
• 54,055 
65,534 
93,600 
154,632 
301,794 
Md. = Shr. 11,980 
X = Sbr. 38,890 
(l) Grorr Profitr = Profitr "before depreciation allowance! 
Alro, ree text p. 23ff, for qual.if ioationr. 
Table 23 
Gross Profit as Percent of Fixed 
Capital Invested 
Rate of 
Return 
Simple (unweighted) 
X of Class 
more than 
- 2007, — 
= 100% — 
200% (loss) 
-100.1$ (loss) 
7-0.1$ (loss) 
2 
2 
3 
- 698.9% 
- 153.1% 
- 27.9% 
0% 
50% 
49.97, 
99.97, 
13 
16 
+ 22.6% 
73.6% 
100% 
200% 
300% 
4007, 
500% 
600% 
7 007= 
300% 
900% 
199.9% 
299.9% 
399.9 /, 
499.9% 
599.97, 
699.9% 
799.9% 
899.9% 
999.97= 
11 
4 
6 
5 
3 
2 
0 
2 
1 
153.8% 
232.1% 
339.1% 
443.4% 
546 . 07, 
646.6% 
to 
86 9 . 97, 
980.4% 
1,000% . 
2,000% -
1,999.9% 
2,999.5% 
3,000% or more. 
1,298.9% 
2,301.8% 
4,865.1% 
N = 37 Md =- 143 .3% 
N.B. Combined or aggregative Rate of return; 
Total Gross Revenue = Shs 3,333,398 = 155.7% 
Investment, Fixed Capital Shs 2,172,077 
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Table 29 
Gross Profit as Percent of 
Invested Capital, Including Stocks' 
Simple 
Rate of (unweighted) 
Return * t S of Class 
More than - 200% (loss) 1 -354.8% 
- 200%„ -100.1% (loss) 2 -130.0% 
- 100% - = 0.1% (loss) 9 - 25.8% 
0% » 49.9% 21 + 26.8% 
50% - 99.9% 15 70.4% 
100% - 199.9% 11 149.9% 
200% - 299.9% 6 255.9% 
300% - 399.9% 4 341.9% 
400% - 499.9% 4 445.8% 
500% - 599.9% 4 559.1% 
600% - 699.9% 2 668.3% 
700% - 799.9% 0 
800% - 899.9% 0 
900% « 999.9% 1 909.9% 
1,000%-1,999,9%, 6 1,482.0% 
2,000% or more 1 5,575.2% 
H = 87 75.1% 
N.B, Combined or aggregative rate of return: 
Gross Profits Shs. 3,383,398 _ 114.7% 
Capital Invested,Incl. Shs. 2,948,700" 
Stocks 
- IS -
Table 30 
Gross Capital - Output Ratio of Firms, 
Using Alternative Measures of Capital 
Capital/Output Capital ,... Capital Capital 
ratio Measure Measure Measure 
No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 1.0 
1.1 1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
0.09 
0.19 
0.29 
0.39 
0.49 
0.59 
0.69 
0.79 
0.89 
0.99 
1.09 
1.19 
1.29 
1.39 
1,49 
35 
20 
10 
3 
4 
3 
2 
1 
2 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
15 
17 
6 
10 
9 
6 
5 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
.. 9" 
15 
11 
. fi-
ll 
5 
5 
.. 3-
. 6 
. 3. 
2 
. 3 
1 
-, 0 
1.5 - 1.99 
2,0 - 2.99 
3.0 and over 
N 
Median Ratio 
Aggregate Capital/Cutptrt 
Ratio . all Firms, 
(4) 
87 
.12 
.24 
1 
3 
(5) 
87 
.33 
.38 
1 
3 
(6) 
07 
.<-3 
,44 
Notes: (1) Capital = Firms'Fixed Investment 
(2) Capital = No, 1 plus estimated value of 
rented buildings. 
(3) Capital = No. 2 plus value of stocks 
(4) 2.50 and 2.56 
(5) 3.33, 3.98, 6.19 
(6) 3.33, 4.04, 7.84 
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Table 31 
Gloss Capital = Labor Ratio of Firms, 
Using Alternative Measures of Capital 
(Investment, in Shillings per employee) 
Capital/labor Ratio, 
(shillings per 
employee) 
Capital, . heaiure (1) 
No* 1 
Capital 
Measure 
No. 2 
f 
(2) 
Capital 
Measure 
No. 3 
(3) 
0 999.9 38 19 12 
1,000 - I,999i9 17 11 12 
2,000 - 2,999.9 3 13 13 
3,000 - 3,999.9 5 8 7 
4,000 - 4,999.9 6 8 7 
5,000 - 5,999.9 5. .,... > 10 10 
6,000 - 6,999.9 1 . 3 6 
7,000 - 7,999.9 3 3 3 
8,000 - 8,999.9 0 4 5 
9,000 - 9,999.9 0 1 3' . 
10,000 -10,999.9 1 1 3 
11,000 -11,999.9 0 0 0 
12,000 -12,999.9 0 0 •o 
13 ,000 -13,999.9 1 0 •o 
14,000 -14,999.9 1 3 0 
15,000 -15,999.9 1, 0 •3 
16,000 or more 0 3 (4) 3 (5) 
N= 87 ' '' 37 87 ' :: 
Median Ratio. Shs. 1,250 Shs. 3,101 Shs. 3,646 
Aggregate Capital/Labor 
Ratio - all firms Shs. 3,055 Shs. 4,871 Shs. 5,566 
Notes: (1) Capital — Firm's Fixed Investment 
(2) Capital = Firm's Fixed Investment plus estimated value 
of Rented Buildings. 
(3) Capital = Firms Fixed Investment plus value of land and 
buildings plus value of stocks. 
(4) Shs. 20,200; 25,819; 25,933. 
(5) Shs. 20,530; 26,026, 27,780. 
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Table 32 
Performance Comparison of Firms Receiving 
Loans at Establishment with those which 
Received No Loans. 
Category of Firms 
1, All 87 firms in sample* aggregate 
Firms receiving no loans, median 
3-. Firms, receiving loans from private 
sources: 
a. Median (2) 
b. Fraction with "better" 
performance than firms with 
no loans. (3) 
Performance Measure 
k7q 
( i ) 
Return 
on K 
155.77, 
151.0% 
120,0% 
2/4 
c, Fraction with "better" performance 
than sample aggregate (3) 
4, Firms receiving loans from 
official sources. 
2/4 
.24 
.11 
48 
°/4 
V , 
.34 
l/9 
4/ Q 
W T 
3055 
1247 
7735 
V v 
1750. 
4/( 
5/c 
1 of 
a. Median (2) 75.7% 
b. Fraction with "better" performance jjg 
than firms with, no loans (3) } 
c. Fraction with "better" performance . 
thau sacple: aggregate (3) '9 
Notes: (t) "K" defined as iutr^Stctent in fixed capital, measure no. 
. Tables 30 and 31. 
(2) Because of very small number of terms 4 and 9 respectively, and 
the very wide dispersion and of owner's performance statistics 
the median rather than the mean is presented, 
(3) "Better" performance is defined as a higher rate of return on 
investment and a lower capital/output or capital/labor ratio. 
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Table 33 
Performance Comparison of Firms Receiving 
Loans for Expansion with those which Received 
no Loans 
Category of Firms 
Performance Measure (1) 
return „, 
on It. ^ 0 K/, 
1, All 87 Firms in sample, aggregate 155.7% 
2, Firms receiving no loans, median 151.4% 
3, Firms receiving loans from private 
sources: 
.24 
.12 
3055 
1200 
4, 
a. median 
b. Fraction with "better" 
performance than firms with no 
loans 
c. Fraction with "better" performance 
than sample aggregate (4) 
Firms receiving loans from 
official sources* 
a. Median 
72.0 
3/( 
3/£ 
72.0 
b. Fraction with "better" performance 
than firms with no loans (4) 3/ 12 
c. Fraction with "better" performance ^. 
than sample aggregate (4) " 1 2 
.09 
5'{ 
5/< 
.17 
4/ 
8/ 
12 
12 
1426 
3/8 
5/ o 
4/ 
7/ 
2762 
12 
12 
Motes: (i) •»£«• defined as investment in fixed capital, Measure Ho. 1 
of Tables 30 and 3le 
(2) The Median rather than the mean is presented because of 
the very small number of firms which received loans, 8 and 12 respectively, 
and also because of great dispersion and skewness of distribution. 
(3) "Better" performance is defined as a higher rate of return 
on investment and a lower capital/output or capital/labor ratio. 
(4) Actually 16 firms, not 12, received official loans. 
These 4 additional firms also received loans from private sources and, 
due to error in computer programming, were omitted from the comparison. 
They will be included in the revised calculations. 
